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ARGUMENT
L

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RULE THAT
WATERS WAS A STATUTORY "KEEPER" IN LIGHT OF THE
UNDISPUTED FACTS.

While the parties' briefs essentially agree on the nature of the issue to be decided, a
material difference in their characterization of that issue must be addressed. Defendant
Powell has expressed the dispositive issue thus: "Whether the trial court erred in failing to
rule on the undisputed facts that Waters was a "keeper" under Utah Code Ann. § 18-1-1?"
Plaintiff Waters phrases the issue as: "Whether the trial court property decided that there
was a material issue of fact whether Waters was a 'keeper' of a dog, within the meaning of
U.C.A. § 18-1-1(1971)?"
Although the district court did state that an issue of fact existed as to whether Waters
was a keeper, that is not a correct characterization of its ruling. The facts were undisputed
on both sides. Application of a statute to undisputed facts is a pure question of law, not
fact. Hansen v. Hansen, 958 P.2d 931,933 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), and cases cited.
In this case, Waters' status as a keeper is conclusively established by her own
testimony. Waters accuses Powell of seeking to define a statutory keeper as "anyone in
temporary possession of a dog," but that is a misstatement of Powell's actual argument. As
discussed in Powell's opening brief, this Court is not writing on a blank slate, because the
Utah Supreme Court has already defined "keeper" for purposes of the dog bite statute:
We hold that the term 'keeper,' as it is used in section 18-1-1, means more than
merely checking to see if a dog has sufficient food and water for a limited time. It is
difficult to frame a universal definition of keeper, but the assumption of custody,
management, and control is intrinsic to the definition. The term implies the exercise
of a substantial number of the incidents of ownership by one who, though not the
owner, assumes to act in his stead. . . . One becomes the keeper of a dog only when
1

he, either with or without the owner's permission, undertakes the manage, control, or
care for it as dog owners in general are accustomed to.
See Brief of Appellant, p. 6, quoting Neztsosie v. Meyer, 883 P.2d 920, 921 (Utah 1994).
Applying the Utah Supreme Court's definition, Waters was a keeper as a matter of
law. This was not someone who simply put out a bowl of water for a neighbor's dog.
Waters was paid to assume custody, management, control, and care of Snoop. As kennel
manager, she held herself out as having training and/or experience to assume these
responsibilities.1
Waters argues that "she was there only to feed and water [Snoop], and keep a
general eye on him." (Brief of Appellee, p. 4.) But she cannot make that argument,
however, because the undisputed facts below - derived from her own deposition testimony
- showed otherwise. According to Waters, her duties as kennel manager included feeding
Snoop, cleaning up after him, ensuring his safety, breaking up fights between dogs, taking
him for bathroom breaks, and exercising him. This is management, control, and/or care that
goes well beyond the minimum incidents of ownership required by Neztsosie, and the
uniform holdings of courts in other jurisdictions. See Brief of Appellant, pp. 7-9, and cases
cited.

1

Waters' assertion that a kennel employee cannot be a keeper, because the "agreement"
to take care of the dog would technically be between the dog's owner and the owner of
the kennel (veterinarian clinic, dog training facility, etc.) is unsupported by any case law.
Moreover, while the statute and definition of keeper do not require any "agreement,"
Waters' argument ignores the fact that an employee, and particularly a manager, agrees to
undertake her duties voluntarily and for compensation, which duties Waters knew
included management, control, and care of dogs placed in her custody.
2

Waters attempts to distinguish some of the cases adverse to her position by noting
that a particular plaintiff might have worked in a veterinarian's office rather than a kennel,
or a particular statute would also allow strict liability against someone who "harbored" a
dog. Neither distinction is material. Neither the wording of Utah's statute, nor its purpose,
provides any justification for applying the statute to a veterinarian but exempting a kennel
manager, particularly when, as in this case, the manager's assumption of responsibility
extends far beyond the mere provision of medical care at issue in the veterinarian cases.
Similarly, the fact that some states' statutes would allow strict liability against
persons who "harbor" a dog is likewise immaterial. In the cases cited, the courts addressed
a party's status as someone who assumed physical custody and the incidents of ownership
of a dog (keeper), not merely someone who happened to have control over premises on
which a dog was present (harborer). The case law on this issue is consistent, and uniformly
supports a holding that Waters was a "keeper" under the undisputed facts.
IL

AS SNOOP'S KEEPER, WATERS CANNOT SUE SNOOP'S OWNER
UNDER THE STATUTE.2

Waters' brief does not dispute that, if Waters was the dog's keeper, she is barred
from suing the dog's owner. That conclusion is self-evident. Courts have uniformly
recognized that keepers are not within the class of persons intended to be protected by dog-

It must be recalled that Waters does not allege any negligence by Powell. For example,
she does not claim that Powell failed to disclose known aggressive tendencies (and, in
fact, claims that it was she who told Powell about Snoop's aggression toward other dogs).
Waters' claim is premised solely upon strict liability under the dog-bite statute.
3

bite statutes, and that allowing owners and keepers to sue each other would lead to "bizarre"
results. See Brief of Appellant, pp. 8-10.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, defendant/appellant Steven Powell respectfully
requests the Court reverse the trial court's denial of summary judgment, and remand with
instructions for the trial court to enter judgment in favor of the defendant.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3^>

day of October, 2009.
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